Introduction
The events of 9/11 left an indelible mark on our nation and sparked the Global War on Terror, including the United States (US)-led military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Two protracted wars, costly in both blood and treasure, have accounted for more than 6,700 deaths and more than 50,000 casualties combined 1 direct ground combat specialties to women across all the services, to include special operations units. 6 It would appear that our senior civilian leaders have discounted the intricacies of our military's mission and the significant distinction between combat and direct ground combat in favor of a misguided attempt at equality. The mission of the US military is to fight and win our nation's wars. Critical to this mission is the combat effectiveness of the force. The very nature of the mission justifies employment discrimination on the basis that in building combat power, the services must be able to select those who are most capable of fighting and winning. 7 The distinction between direct ground combat and combat is not subtle; rather, direct ground combat, offensive in nature, seeks to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy; whereas being in combat can be defined more loosely in terms of a supporting role, such as that of logisticians or military policeman, potentially being exposed to but not seeking out the enemy in the execution of a mission. The aspects of direct ground combat missions necessitate the physical capacity to endure unforgiving environments for long durations and the unremitting exposure to the grueling, cruel, and violent nature of war. Throughout history, women have unquestionably acquitted themselves honorably and courageously in defense of our nation while serving in combat. Nonetheless, despite their proximity and exposure to violent combat and even their heroic endeavors, women did not serve in specialties whose mission entails deliberate offensive combat operations.
Little evidence suggests women are suited to fill the direct ground combat arms military occupational specialties (MOSs), and more specifically, those 6 percent (21 of 336 MOSs) in the Marine Corps that were recently opened by Carter when he denied the Corps' request for an exception to policy. 8 Rather, medical research, countless studies, and the Marine Corps' own internal analysis and experimentation have largely concluded that women are less suited for the physical demands of direct ground combat arms MOSs. Several studies 9 point to the realized and potential detrimental health impacts to women associated with these physically demanding roles.
The aspects of direct ground combat arms combined with the physiological differences between genders will inevitably degrade readiness, deplete a talented pool of women from the total force, and impact the overall combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps if women are fully integrated into direct ground combat arms specialties. Instead of integrating women in direct ground combat arms specialties, resources must be channeled toward recruiting and retaining women in roles where they are best-qualified and fully capable of performing and capitalizing on their strengths; therefore affording servicewomen the opportunity to ascend to and succeed at more senior levels of the national security system.
Thesis
Integrating women in the Marine Corps' infantry will degrade readiness, deplete a talented pool of women from the total force, and impact the overall combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps.
Background The Road to Lifting the Ban on Women in Direct Ground Combat Arms Roles
The expanded role of women and their distinguished performance during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm attracted the attention of Congress, which in 1991 ordered the creation of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.
Established by the Defense Authorization Act, which became Public Law 102-190, the Commission was required to "assess the laws and policies restricting the assignment of female service members and to make recommendations to the President by 15 November 1992." 10 Prior
to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, policies for the Marine Corps and Army were largely shaped in terms of a linear battlefield characterized by front lines populated by combat arms units that faced imminent danger and rear lines populated with command and control and combat service support units in a comparatively safe area. 11 The Commission conducted a comprehensive review of service policies and analyzed the physiological rigors of the direct ground combat arms service member through testimony, comprehensive research, and public surveys. 12 The Commission recommended that DOD policy encourage the recruitment of and optimize the utilization of women in the armed forces, that military readiness remain the driving factor regarding assignment policies, that women should be excluded from direct land combat units and positions, and that service policies concerning direct land combat exclusions be codified. 13 More importantly, the Commission highlighted key factors that remain relevant today despite being based on what is now considered an outdated definition of direct ground combat given the present-day characterization of the non-linear battlefield. Specifically, the Commission found that despite technological advances, the characteristics of direct ground combat remained just as hazardous and physically demanding as in previous generations. Additionally, the Commission cited evidence of the distinct physiological differences between genders; specifically, women are shorter in stature, have less muscle, and weigh less than men. 14 Inferior muscular strength and aerobic capacity place women at a distinct disadvantage when performing tasks required for direct ground combat specialties, which include marching under load for prolonged periods, lugging weapons and ammunition, navigating obstacles, and carrying the wounded or dead. 15 The Commission also determined that while some women could meet the physical standards for direct ground combat arms specialties, the evidence showed most women are physically incapable of meeting the standards. 16 possess the physical capacity to perform in heavy lifting or combat arms MOSs and that when training in these specialties, disproportionate higher musculoskeletal injury rates occur in women in comparison to their male counterparts. 24 Correspondingly, there is also no evidence to indicate that women can overcome the physical disparity between genders with training. According to Rear Admiral Hugh Scott, USN, retired, an expert in military medicine, unalterable androgenic hormones in men account for greater muscle power and aerobic capacity for endurance, which is the reason why they develop larger muscle bulk than women do in weight training and exercise. 25 This extensive body of evidence-based science challenges the premise of a genderneutral military. Moreover, the evidence suggests that a gender-neutral military will be costly to individual servicewomen's health and careers, and detrimentally affect the readiness of the services.
Compromising the Health and Welfare of the Force High Attrition and Impacts to Readiness
The General study found that "women not only suffer more injuries than men during combat training" but also that "female soldiers suffer depression at more than double the rate of men and that one of the triggers is exposure to combat." 27 Similarly, the Marine Corps reported significant evidence of higher injury rates for females when compared to males in its analysis of the integration of female Marines into direct ground combat arms specialties. The report attributed the injuries to the upper and lower-body strength deficiency and higher fatigue levels in women as the cause of overuse injuries, such as stress fractures. 28 On the battlefield, strength deficiency and fatigue lead to diminished survivability and lethality, which translates to staying alive and killing the enemy. These disproportionate injury rates result in significant expenditure of medical resources for the services and decrease overall readiness and combat effectiveness of the force and cannot be summarily dismissed.
How the Reality of Gender Disparity Plays Out in the Public Sector
Examination of the US Fire Service provides insight into a comparable civilian sector organization. Specifically, there are strong parallels between the Marine Corps and the US Fire
Service in strength and aerobic requirements, the necessity to operate in varying and dangerous environments, and the correspondingly high injury rates reported among women. The Marine
Corps, currently at about 188,000 Marines, is made up of approximately 7.7 percent women. 29 The US Fire Service, a force of about 307,000 employees, is made up of approximately 3.5 percent women. 30 The Marine Corps direct ground combat arms specialties and the US Fire
Service rely heavily on a high level of intense physical capacity. Where lack of physical ability translates to a lethality and survivability issue for Marines, the lack of physical ability in firefighting can lead to diminished survivability of the firefighter or the subject of rescue attempts. Dr. Paul Davis, founder of First Responder Institute and leading expert on physical fitness and standards for military, firefighters, and law enforcement, offers that "there are strong similarities between the Marine Corps and US Fire Service. Injury rates among women working in this industry are similar to those reported in military settings where the incidence is four times that of their male counterparts." 31 The basic conclusion is that physiological differences do lead to disproportionate injury rates for women when subjected to the rigorous physical demands required for occupations that rely heavily on physical strength and aerobic capacity, in both the military and civilian sectors of society.
Marine Corps' Tenet -Train Like We Fight, Fight Like We Train
The intensity of training required to sustain a high level of readiness in the direct ground combat arms MOSs increases after entry-level training in order to prepare for full-spectrum conflict and high deployment operational tempo, especially for Marine Corps infantry battalions. 33 ) can train to the initial standards required for direct ground combat arms specialties, the evidence suggests they will not be able to maintain the status quo on par with their male counterparts once they enter the operating forces.
Davis asserts that while anyone can improve with extra training, maintaining the higher bar is another thing entirely and, for women, often results in injuries that are a consequence of over-training and can be career-ending. 34 In spite of the assurances of those advocating for integration that standards will not be lowered, it seems inevitable that lowering standards would be the only way to neutralize the physical disparity. Additionally, the evidence supports that the cumulative health impacts that result from women's physical disparities as they progress in their careers should they be subjected to the direct ground combat arms specialties will most likely exacerbate the normal changes associated with aging, to include degenerative arthritis, osteoarthritis, and osteoporosis. 35 Instead of being offered more opportunities for career advancement, women are being offered specialties with high attrition in which they have no realistic chance to succeed. They are being set up for failure. Accordingly, as Marine General
John Kelly recently predicted, pressure might develop to lower standards so more women can serve in direct ground combat arms specialties. Combat", "Myth#5 -Opening the infantry will provide a better pathway to senior rank for the talented women." 39 As Newbold pointed out, changing women's peer norms when they are injected into direct ground combat arms specialties will likely stunt their careers, rather than providing them an opportunity for career advancement. 40 If the expectation is to rise in the ranks as a leader, whether officer or enlisted, meeting the standards is not good enough.
Credibility, especially in the direct ground combat arms specialties, is largely based on a leader's physical abilities because of the grueling demands and shared misery that are characteristic of the profession. Subordinates expect their leaders to exceed standards and raise the bar. A third-class fitness test, the lowest end of the scale, will not inspire Marines to follow their leader regardless of gender. It must be leadership from the front, where leaders set the highest examples for their Marines to follow. If they stave off injury through MOS entry-level training, women will find the competition fierce in the operating forces, especially at the more senior company grade and junior field grade levels in the officer ranks and noncommissioned and staff noncommissioned officer enlisted ranks. Physical disparities will be on full exhibition.
The Marine Corps' current pyramid grade structure is already highly competitive. For example, it only boasts one active duty female Marine general officer, or .004 percent of the Marine Corps officer population. 41 Hence, the very few women deemed qualified to serve in direct ground combat arms specialties will find the system even harder as male Marines will have a clear advantage in direct ground combat arms specialties.
What About the Women that are Better than the Bottom Five or Ten Percent of Men?
The intent of the MLDC was to increase overall percentages of women across the military services and create career advancement opportunities for women at more senior levels.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen labeled this a strategic imperative initiative. 42 Placing exceptionally talented women with unlimited potential in direct ground combat arms specialties would appear to contradict and undermine the basis of diversity of this strategic imperative initiative. Furthermore, in May 2015 during his address at the US Naval Academy, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus called for an increase of women in the Naval Services, to include the ambitious goal of 1 in 4 enlisted Marines to be women. 43 It is widely known that less than 1 percent of citizens serve in the military 44 , and of those, a very small percentage are women. If the intent is to simultaneously increase women across the armed forces while placing them in specialties that by their very nature lead to high attrition and make women less competitive among their peers, then these initiatives are in direct contradiction. With the Marine Corps aggressively working to answer Mabus' call to further diversify the force it is difficult to ascertain the logic in opening specialties characterized by high attrition to women that are at a distinct disadvantage to their male counterparts.
The service is challenged with not only recruiting more women 45 but also with retaining higher percentages. Statistics show that the Marine Corps is losing women after the rank of captain for officers and after the rank of sergeant for enlisted. 46 The service would be better served investing resources in programs focused on retaining women among its more senior ranks than to expend finite resources searching for the physical elites that may possibly replace the bottom 5 percent or 10 percent of men in direct ground combat arms specialties. According to a RAND Corporation study, targeting women for infantry specialties could cost the Marine Corps $2 million annually in additional recruiting and retention expenditures. 47 Furthermore, how does a woman advance through the ranks when she's only as good as the bottom 5 percent or 10 percent of her peer group? The answer is she does not; in the case of enlisted Marines, they are not approved for reenlistment and for officers, they are not career designated. The statistics bear out that women are not limited by their exclusion from serving in direct ground combat arms specialties; rather, they are limited only by their personal desire and choice to pursue prolonged careers in an already demanding occupation, especially in the case of the Marine Corps.
The Law of Unintended Consequences
The magnitude of the second-and third-order effects of rescinding the DGCDAR has not been adequately addressed by policy makers. Presumably, civilian leaders will place the burden on the services to grapple with the details of a gender-neutral military and will suggest that leadership will overcome any challenges or obstacles. Enlisted assignment policies are one example that highlights the complexity of this issue. While male enlisted personnel can choose whether to pursue a direct ground combat arms MOS or not, male Marines assigned to noncombat arms MOSs do not get a choice of unit to which they are assigned. If women are fully integrated into direct ground combat arms MOSs, women assigned to non-combat arms MOSs will now be eligible to serve in direct ground combat arms units, regardless of their desires.
A 2014 Army survey revealed that more than 92 percent of women were not interested in being assigned to a direct ground combat arms unit that is currently all-male. 48 This percentage is consistent with the 1992 Presidential Commission findings. The sentiments of women surveyed remain unchanged over the course of two decades. Given the lack of interest in serving in a capacity affiliated with direct ground combat arms specialties, this will most likely alienate the career force and, most assuredly, dissuade females from leaning towards military service.
Additionally, Congress will have to address Selective Service registration. Ultimately, the legal rationale for all-male conscription would dissolve, subjecting women to the draft. extremely complex operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is because they were trained to survive and succeed in a combat environment. But, serving in a combat environment or exposure to enemy action in combat does not translate into what is required for a Marine whose mission it is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy, which is foundational to direct ground combat arms. Furthermore, the performance of women in combat is testament to the service's ability to judiciously manage its talent and provide world-class training to its service members. To jump to the conclusion that women are now suited to serve in direct ground combat arms specialties because they acquitted themselves so well in combat, or to point to the accomplishments of the few women that graduated from the Army's Ranger School as justification for a gender-neutral military, is misguided.
The Bias Is Not Institutional, the Bias Is Physiological
The Marine Corps has taken a transparent, methodical approach in addressing integration of women into direct ground combat arms specialties. Shortly after Panetta's announcement to rescind the DGCDAR policy, the Marine Corps embarked on a comprehensive analysis and experimentation campaign, executed according to DOD's prescribed methodology. 50 The methodology was strongly endorsed by Mabus in his Department of Navy Talent Post, the study found that overall the male-only direct ground combat arms units performed better than the gender-integrated direct ground combat arms units. Specifically, male-only infantry units shot more accurately, carried more weight, and moved more quickly through specific tactical exercises. 53 Male-only units were more lethal and thus more combat-effective than the gender-integrated units. Women had higher injury rates than men, including stress fractures that resulted from carrying heavy loads. 54 Despite evidence in the report, proponents of the full integration of women questioned the validity of the findings on grounds that the experiment had predisposed outcomes, the women selected were average, and that the women were not afforded the ability to train to the standards. Only three months after his speech strongly endorsing the Marine Corps' experimentation methodology, Mabus publicly challenged the Marine Corps' conclusions and openly criticized the caliber of its female participants. 55 The GCE-ITF unit was assembled as an all-volunteer force, including the women, just as the military is assembled now. The purported physical elites that defy the law of averages were not attracted to the opportunity to participate in the physically demanding direct ground combat arms study. Furthermore, while the male Marines serving in the direct ground combat arms units possessed direct ground combat arms specialties, the provisional male Marines and their female counterparts both possessed nonground combat arms specialties so they were on equal footing. According to the report, not only did the all-male direct ground combat arms teams outperform the integrated direct ground combat arms teams in almost every evaluated event during the GCE-ITF experiment, but the allmale provisional platoon also outperformed the integrated provisional platoon, dispelling the myth that women did not succeed due to a lack of training. 56 The outcome of the provisional platoon portion of the experiment is a vital indicator of how integrated units fare against their allmale counterparts without any preparatory training -essentially, a level playing field exposes the impacts of integration.
The reality of a level playing field was also apparent in two experiments conducted during the enlisted and officer Entry Level Training assessments. During highly publicized integration testing conducted at Infantry Officer Course (IOC) over the course of a two-and-ahalf year period, with the Marine Corps setting a goal for 100 volunteers, only 29 females volunteered. This after Marine Corps officials expanded the pool of eligible participants midway through testing to all female company grade officers, not just newly commissioned lieutenants that were recent graduates of TBS. Of the 29, none completed the training, with the majority not making it past the Combat Endurance Test at the start of the course. 57 Most of the IOC failures occurred immediately after the women had completed TBS, when they could not have been better prepared. In contrast, during that same timeframe, 71 percent of the 978 males completed the grueling course. 58 Finally, only 36 percent of enlisted females graduated from the ITB experiment compared to 98 percent for their male counterparts during that same timeframe. 59 The findings all reinforce the original position of the 1992 Presidential Commission that there is an inextricable linkage between physical capacity and job performance in the direct ground combat arms specialties. There is no escaping the reality that women, even with the law of averages aside, are at a distinct competitive disadvantage relative to their male peers because of the heavy emphasis on physical strength and aerobic capacity.
The 'Dempsey Rule' Will Compromise Standards
Development of gender-neutral standards for direct ground combat arms MOSs assessed during nine-month GCE-ITF experimentation is a positive by-product of the gender-integration discussion. 60 The new gender-neutral standards implemented on 30 September 2015 61 are meant to augment or replace Training and Readiness manual standards and will affect direct ground combat arms requirements for entry-level MOS-producing schools. 62 The results even revealed where some standards should be raised for infantry men. 63 With these new gender-neutral standards under development and in practice, the GCE-ITF still yielded lopsided results between the all-male and gender-integrated units. Additionally, the study reported that females were 19 percent more likely than males to incur an occupational-related injury and that 40.5 percent of females sustained musculoskeletal injuries, compared to 18.8 percent for their male counterparts. 64 Despite the results of the study that includes revamped standards, Mabus appeared to have already made up his mind, proclaiming that, "I've been pretty clear, and I've been pretty clear about this for a while: I'm not going to ask for an exemption for the Marines." 65 Therefore, civilian leadership has based policy decisions on input other than the facts or evidence and has also convinced some senior military officials as well. In January 2013, following Panetta's announcement to repeal the DGCDAR, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey said that if "a particular standard is so high that a woman couldn't make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain to the secretary, why is it that high? Does it really have to be that high?" 66 Finally, despite the heralded success of the two women soldiers who graduated the Army's elite Ranger School in August 2015, there are questions as to the integrity of the assessment. Republican Congressman Steve Russell from Oklahoma requested performance records on the female students that graduated Ranger School for verification that standards were not altered. 67 Internally, officials from Fort Benning claimed that an Army general announced a woman would graduate Ranger School as preparations were being made for the first females to attend the gender-integrated assessment. 68 The real question then is what constitutes gender integration and thus, what will satisfy the civilian leadership and those advocating for full integration? The implication is that it will not be good enough to simply open these direct ground combat arms specialties to women, but rather, to guarantee their success in suitable numbers. When the law of averages kicks in, overwhelming evidence suggests that current standards will lead to attrition. Attrition will have a knock-on effect on health, welfare, and talent management that goes completely against the intent of gender-diversity goals.
The crux of the issue for the Marine Corps is determining what successful integration looks like, especially if no women officers can pass IOC and only a handful of enlisted female the US Naval Academy, asserted that he could produce female SEALs. 69 Yet, none of the women officers that attempted IOC, to include available Naval Academy graduates, made it through the less elite and considerably shorter IOC training. Ostensibly, gender-diversity goals will force standards to be reassessed and lowered over time, essentially backing the services into the Dempsey Rule, despite fervent claims from the current Secretaries of Defense and Navy that training standards would not be lowered. 70 Dismissing the overwhelming evidence and the crude and grueling nature of close combat solely for the purpose of expanding opportunities for women is derelict, and as Brigadier General George Smith, Director of the Marine Corps Force
Innovation Office, stated in his memorandum to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, "Our future enemies will be the ultimate arbiter of such decisions -when lives of our Marines are in the balance. Those who choose to turn a blind eye to those immutable realities do so at the expense of our Corps' warfighting capability and, in turn, the security of the nation."
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Recommendation
The author's recommendation is that Congress should enact law prohibiting women from integration into direct ground combat arms specialties in order to preserve readiness, grow the talented pool of women, and ensure combat effectiveness of the military force. Proponents that advocate for opening direct ground combat arms specialties to women will posit that leadership is what will make the difference in making final integration of a gender-neutral military a reality.
In one respect, they may be right. However, it's not the leadership from within the military that is required. Our nation needs its civilian leaders, not those that make policy, but those that legislate law, whose mandate under the US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14, gives Congress the authority "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." 
Conclusion
Compelling empirical evidence challenges the rationale of a gender-neutral military and further suggests that integrating women in the Marine Corps' infantry will degrade readiness, deplete a talented pool of women from the total force, and impact overall combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. Those advocating for expanding the roles of women based on individual capabilities are dismissing the adverse effects and unintended consequences, which include disproportionate risks of debilitating injuries, impacts to readiness, consequences for recruiting and retention, and reduced combat effectiveness, to name a few.
Ultimately, the military's ability to support national defense must take precedence over all other considerations, including the career prospects of individual service members and misguided and misunderstood justifications for equal opportunities, and thus does not warrant None of the proponents of a gender-neutral military has argued that setting aside all the overwhelming evidence in support of a gender-neutral military is justified by military necessity.
Why should the military pay the price and bear the burden to promote equal opportunities and career progression for the ambitious few? There is no doubt that not all men are qualified to serve in the direct ground combat arms, nor do they want to. However, there is also not a shortage; rather, the direct ground combat arms specialties are fiercely competitive. The debate is really about a perfunctory few individuals who have yet to materialize, these physical elites or Amazons, who apparently will defy decades of medical research and evidence.
The 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert Barrow's testimony to Congress in 1991 remains timeless in capturing the essence of the argument in that, "This is not nor should it be about women's rights, equal opportunity or career assignments for enhancement purposes for selection to higher rank. It is most assuredly about combat effectiveness, combat readiness, winning the next conflict, and so we are talking about national security." 75 As such, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford, while serving in the capacity of the 36th Commandant of the Marine Corps, remained steadfast against political pressure and public rhetoric. Instead, he provided his best military advice in recommending against the full integration of women in all direct ground combat arms specialties based on evidence and facts. 76 Furthermore, the Marine Corps has been forthcoming with information throughout its analysis and experimentation, avoiding deceit and misconception throughout. For those advocates of a gender-neutral military who wish to invalidate the analyses and experimentation conducted by the Marine Corps, where is the evidence to suggest that integrating women in direct ground combat arms roles is prudent? So far, none has been produced. The facts and evidence bear out that there exists absolutely no cogent, convincing case for assigning women to direct ground combat arms specialties and thus putting at risk our nation's blood and treasure.
Notes
